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RECENT CASE NOTES
BANxRUPTcY-JumiSDICTION OF FEDERAL COuRTS-Surr ON UNPAID STOCK 
SuB-
scRrIToN.-The trustee of a bankrupt California corporation brought suit in
equity in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia against the defendant and about 3,ooo other residents of the district to
recover overdue balances on unconditional stock subscriptions. The defendant
moved to dismiss the bill. Held, that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. Kelley v. Gill (1917) 38 Sup. Ct 38.
This decision settles an important point, previously uncertain, in the admin-
istration of bankrupt corporations. The broad jurisdiction conferred upon bank-
ruptcy courts by section 2(7) of the Bankruptcy Act is restricted by section
23(b), which prohibits the trustee (subject to certain exceptions) from suing a
defendant, without his consent, in a court other than that in which the bankrupt
might have sued had bankruptcy not intervened. The limits of the federal
court's jurisdiction were much clarified by Bardes v. Hawarden Bank (goo)
178 U. S. 524, and the i9o3 and 19io amendments to "section 23(b). But some
authorities still asserted that a suit in equity to collect unpaid stock subscriptions
would lie in the district courts. Skillin v. Magnus (x9o7, D. C., N. D. N. Y.)
162 Fed. 689; 7 C. J. 255. In the instant case it was argued that a bill in equity
against all the stockholders was authorized by the igio amendment to section
47a(2), giving the trustee all the rights, remedies and powers of a judgment
creditor; that this was not a suit which the bankrupt itself could have brought
and that therefore the suit was not within the prohibition of section 23(b). But
the Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy for the trustee, as well
as for the bankrupt, was a separate suit at law against each stockholder, the
reason being that there was no common issue between the alleged stockholders
and the corporation and therefore no basis for equity taking jurisdiction to
avoid a multiplicity of suits at law. It is true that a judgment creditor may sue
all the stockholders in equity to reach unpaid stock subscriptions as assets of the
debtor corporation. Harmon v. Page (1882) 62 Cal. 448. But to the argument
that section 47a(2), as amended in igio, gave the trustee a similar remedy, the
court merely replied that the amendment "did not confer new means of collect-
ing ordinary claims due the bankrupt" Whether this was intended as an authori-
tative interpretation of that amendment is left somewhat doubtful by the addi-
tional statement that even if equity were to take jurisdiction to avoid multi-
plicity of actions at law, the suit could not be brought in the federal court,
because the cause of action was one on which the bankrupt could have sued
only in a state court. The trustee's power to sue at law in the state courts is
clear. Jeffery v. Selwyn (917) 22o N. Y. 77, 1i5 N. E. 275; Clevenger v.
Moore (904) 71 N. J. L. 148, 58 Atl. 88. In the instant case the subscriptions
were overdue, so that no order by the bankruptcy court directing payment of
subscriptions was a necessary condition precedent to fixing the stockholders'
liability. The opinion expressly leaves open the question whether the federal
court has jurisdiction when such an order is necessary, either in lieu of a call
or for the purpose of pro-rating among the stockholders the amount necessary
to be collected to satisfy creditors. Cf. Scoville v. Thayer (i881) IO5 U. S. 143.
BANKRUPTCY-PROPERTY PASSING To TRUsTEE-INSURANcE POLICY RESERVING
PoWER TO CHANGE BENE=CxARY-Policies on the bankrupt's life having a cash
surrender value were payable to named beneficiaries but reserved to the insured
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the power to change the beneficiaries without their consent The trustee claimed
that the bankrupt must either deliver the policies or pay him their cash sur-
render value. Held, that the trustee was entitled to the relief claimed. Cohen v.
Samuels (1917) 38 Sup. Ct 36.
The interpretation of section 7oa(5) of the Bankruptcy Act has caused much
disagreement among the lower federal courts. Clause (5) vests in the trustee
property which the bankrupt might by any means have transferred or which was
subject to judicial levy and sale, with the proviso that "when any bankrupt shall
have any insurance policy .which has a cash surrender value payable to himself,
his estate or representatives," he may pay its cash surrender value to the trustee
and continue to hold "such policy free from the claims of the creditors . . . ;
otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets." This language was
capable of two constructions. One line of cases held the view that only policies
having a cash surrender value passed to the trustee. Gould v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.
(i9o4, D. C., E. D. Ark) 132 Fed. 927. Other courts maintained that all policies
payable to the bankrupt were vested in the trustee by that portion of clause (5)
which preceded the proviso, and that the proviso merely gave the bankrupt a
power to redeem such policies as had a cash surrender value by paying this sum
to the trustee. In re Welling (I9o2, C. C. A. 7th) 113 Fed. i89; and see Rem-
ington, Bankruptcy (2d ed.) sec. ioo2 et seq. The controversy was settled by the
Supreme Court in Burlingham v. Crouse (1913) 228 U. S. 459, 33 Sup. Ct 564
and Everett v. Judson (1913) 228 U. S. 474, 33 Sup. Ct 568. These cases held
that the interest of the trustee in life insurance policies extended only to their cash
surrender value determined as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
On the strength of these decisions it has been thought by some authorities that
the trustee's sole source of title is the proviso, and that consequently a policy not
expressly payable to the bankrupt, his estate or representatives, does not pass
to the trustee, even though the bankrupt has the power to change the beneficiary
at will and thus obtain for himself the cash surrender value of the policy. This
was the holding of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in the
instant case. In re Samuels (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 237 Fed. 796. See also Reming-
ton, Bankruptcy (2d ed.) see. lOO9; In re Arkin (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 231 Fed.
947; cf. In re Haminel (i915, C. C. A. 2d) 221 Fed. 56. But see contra: Malone
v. Cohn (1916, C. C. A. 5th) 236 Fed. 882; In re Bonvillain (1916, E. D. La.)
232 Fed. 370; In re Shoemaker (1915, E. D. Pa.) 225 Fed. 329. Fortunately the
dispute has now been settled by supreme authority and the more liberal interpre-
tation finally established. The court did not deem it necessary to support its
decision by any extended arjument The fact that the policies, while not payable
to the bankrupt, could be made so at his will and by his simple declaration, was
thought to bring the case within the proviso, even if that were regarded alone.
But the court also buttressed its decision by a reference to clause (3) of section
7oa which confers upon the trustee all powers which the bankrupt might have
exercised for his own benefit. Whether the reference to clause (3) was intended
as an argument in support of the court's construction of the proviso, or as an
assertion that the bankrupt's power to change the beneficiary passed to the
trustee by virtue of clause (3), does not clearly appear.
CAIRIERs-STATE REGULATION OF RATES-CMMUTATION Tic=s.-A railroad
company sought an injunction to restrain the -Public Service Commission of
Maryland from enforcing an order revising a schedule filed by the company of
proposed increases in its voluntarily established commutation rates for intrastate
passenger service. Held, that the injunction was properly refused since, in a
case where the railroad had itself established special commutation rates, the
RECENT CASE NOTES
state had power to regulate such rates on the basis of a lower charge than for
ordinary passenger service. White, C. J., McKenna and Reynolds, J. J. dissent-
ing (without opinion). Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Towers (1917) 38 Sup. Ct i.
The limitation to cases where the railroad had itself voluntarily established
commutation rates resulted from the state court's construction of the powers
of the State Commission as limited to such cases. The reasoning of the opinion
would seem equally applicable to cases where no such rates had previously been
established and also to interstate commutation rates. The authority to estab-
lish a lower rate for special forms of passenger service than is enforced as a
reasonable rate for general service had been recognized by the Supreme Court
in earlier decisions. Interstate Cons. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts (igo7) 207
U. S. 79, 28 Sup. Ct 26 (reduced rates for school children's tickets) ; Minnesota
Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct 729 (half fare tickets for children
under 12). This principle had also been expressly applied to commutation
tickets both by the Interstate Commerce Commission and by state courts.
Commutation Rate Case (II) 21 Int Com. Rep. 428; People v. Public Ser-
vice Commission (1914, N. Y.) 159 App. Div. 531, 145 N. Y. Supp. 503, affirmed
215 N. Y. 689, iog N. E. io8g. In the regulation of freight rates, and of the
rates of such public utilities as telephone companies and electric light and power
companies, more or less elaborate classification with different unit charges for
different classes of service is of course familiar practice, and in fact is recog-
nized as a practical necessity. The doubt in regard to commutation rates arose
from the decision in Lake Shore & M..S. R. R. Co. v. Smith (1899) 173 U. S.
684, i9 Sup. Ct 565. In that case the court held that a state could not by
statute require the issuing of mileage tickets at a less rate than the maximum
rate per mile also fixed by statute for passenger travel in general. In the prin-
cipal case commutation tickets are distinguished from mileage tickets, and
expressions in the opinion in the Lake Shore case at variance with the present
decision are expressly overruled. The result commends itself as in line with
the general principles of public service regulation.
CoNFLicr OF LAws-DuE PRoczss-JuRisDICTioN OF NoN-REsIEDNT SERVED
By PUBLICATION.-An equitable action for separate maintenance was brought in
Washington, one defendant, the husband, being a non-resident served by pub-
lication only, and the others defendants, personally served in Washington, being
respectively a trustee of the absent husband and the maker of a promissory note
payable to him. Against the trustee and the debtor an injunction issued restrain-
ing payments to the husband and ordering the funds to be paid into court when
realized or due. The defendants contested the court's jurisdiction. Held, that
the injunction was a sufficient proceeding against the property interests of the
defendant to stamp the suit as one in rein and that the court had jurisdiction.
Four justices dissenting. Kelley v. Bausman (1917, Wash.) 168 Pac. 18I.
Three successive questions may arise for determination in such a case: (i)
Whether the statutes governing suits against non-residents are intended to
include not only attachments and garnishments but also suits in equity wherein
an injunction is sought against a resident debtor, or other obligor, of the non-
resident defendant. Under their respective statutes some courts have decided
the question affirmatively. Bragg v. Gaynor (1893) 85 Wis. 468, 55 N. W. gig;
Benner v. Benner (igoo) 63 Oh. St. 220, 58 N. E. 569. Contra, Waldock v.
Atkins (igi6, Okla.) 158 Pac. 587. See also, Rhoades v. Rhoades (197o) 78 Neb.
495, Ill N. W. 122 (receiver appointed and jurisdiction sustained). (2) Whether
in the absence of statutory authorization a court of equity may assume juris-
diction in such a case. No case has been found involving this precise point.
(3) Whether with or without a statute such an assumption of jurisdiction is
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due process of law to the absent defendant In the principal case there was
an injunction plus an order to pay into court. A garnishment proceeding is
practically the same in object, method and effect, and seemingly identical in
principle. A garnishment is regarded as a suit quasi in rein and has been held
to be due process of law even as to defendants served only by publication.
Coyne v. Plume (1917) go Conn. 293, 297, 97 Atl. 337, 339. It is submitted that
a proceeding by injunction, as in the principal case, should likewise be held to
be due process. See Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bk. (917) 243 U. S. 269, 37
Sup. Ct 282; also (917) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL 252, and the following headnote.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JUDGMENTS QUASI IN REM-FuLL FAITH AND CRE.-DrrSuit
having been brought in Missouri on a policy of life insurance and a judgment in
Connecticut having been set up by the insurance company as a defense, the Mis-
souri court so interpreted both the Connecticut judgment and the company's
Connecticut charter as to favor the plaintiff's recovery. Held, that not only must
the judgment be given full faith and credit but the powers conferred by a Con-
necticut charter, as interpreted by the Connecticut court, must be likewise
observed. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber (917) 38 Sup. Ct. 54.
See CoMMENTs, next month, and compare the discussion of a closely related
problem (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL 255.
CoNSTiTUTiONAL LAw-PowERS OF THE STATES-TREATY-MAKING PowERs.-
A local drainage board of North Dakota entered into an agreement with a
Canadian municipality for the construction of a drain across the international
boundary. Held, that the agreement was not unconstitutional as a violation of
Article i Section io of the Federal Constitution prohibiting a state from entering
into any agreement or compact with another state or foreign power without the
consent of Congress. McHenry County.v. Brady (1917, N. D.) 163 N. W. 540.
A case in which the United States Supreme Court discussed the power of a
state to enter into agreements with a foreign country contains a dictum adverse
to such a power. Holmes v. Jennison (184o, U. S.) 14 Pet. 54o. Numerous cases,
however, have supported the power of a state to enter into agreements with
other states of the Union on matters not infringing the political prerogatives of
the Federal Government Virginia v. Tennessee (1892) 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct.
728; Wharton v. Wise (1893) 153 U. S. 155, L4 Sup. Ct 783; Fisher v. Steele
(1887) 39 La. Ann. 447, I So. 882; Stearnes v. Minnesota (i9oo) 179 U. S. 223,
21 Sup. Ct. 73; Union Branch Railroad v. E. Tenn. (1853) L4 Ga. 327. In reli-
ance largely upon dicta in these cases the court in the principal case concluded
that the local board had the power without the consent of Congress to enter
into an agreement with a foreign municipality which did not "encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." Whether the contract
did so encroach would be a question of fact in each case. The Constitution by
another clause of Section io of Article i absolutely prohibits a state under all
circumstances from entering into any formal treaty with a foreign state. The
power of states to enter into interstate (and, according to the instant case,
apparently international) non-political agreements without the consent of Con-
gress finds an analogy in the po.wer of the federal executive to enter into agree-
ments with foreign countries without the consent of the Senate. But the
distinction should be noted that while states are limited with respect to subject
matter to unimportant non-political administrative matters, the power of the
federal executive to enter into agreements is not limited by the importance of
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the subject matter but only by the form of the agreement, i. e., treaties 
proper.
Witness the Lansing-Ishii agreement recently concluded, the importance 
of
which is not in any way reflected by the informal documents in 
which it is
recorded.
CoNsmTrnONAL LAw-TAKINr- PROPERTY WITHOUT DuE PRocEss-INvALiTY
OF A SEGREGATION ORDINANc--A white man brought a bill for specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell land to a negro, the contract being expressly made
subject to the latter's "right" under the law to occupy the premises as a resi-
dence. A Louisville ordinance, held valid by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
forbade the future occupancy by white man or negro of a residence in a block
where the majority of residences were occupied by persons of the other race.
All privileges of occupancy already accrued at the time of enactment were
expressly saved. Held, that the power of unrestricted alienation was a property
right protected by the Constitution, and that the ordinance was invalid as taking
property without due process of law. Buchanan v. Warley (1917) 38 Sup. Ct i6.
See COx MENTS, p. 393.
CoNTRAcTs-AccETAxcE-AcTs NECESSARY TO FoaR A UNILATERAL 
CON-
mcr-The defendant wrote to the plaintiff, her son-in-law, that if he would
move from Missouri to Maine and would care for the defendant on the home
place during her life, he should have the use of the place during her life and
the complete ownership at her death. The plaintiff moved as requested and
cared for the defendant a few weeks, when the defendant repudiated her
promise without just cause. The plaintiff sued in equity for an injunction
against an ejectment suit and for a decree that the defendant should hold the
legal title as trustee for the plaintiff. Held, that a unilateral contract was
formed when the plaintiff moved to Maine and there began to care for the
defendant, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief asked. Brackenbury v.
Hodgkin (1917, Me.) I02 Atl. io6.
See COMMENTS, p. 382.
CONTRACTS-CONsIDERATION FOR UNILATERAL CONTRAcT-PERFORMANCE BY
PROMISEE AS REQUIRED BY PREvIOiUs CONTRACT WITH A THIRD PERso.-The
defendant's daughter became engaged to an Italian count; and thereafter the
defendant made a written promise that, in consideration of the fact that the
daughter was affianced to and was to be married to the count, he would pay
$25oo to his daughter on the day set for the marriage and annually thereafter.
This writing was delivered to the count, and the wedding took place as expected.
The plaintiff, as assignee of both the count and his wife, sues for the eleventh
annual instalment. Held, that the marriage in accordance with their previous
engagement was a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. Attilio
DeCicco v. Schweizer (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7.
The plaintiff was under contract with the owner of a mare, named Grace, to
drive her in the Kentucky Futurity race. The defendant, being the owner of
the sire, the dam, and two brothers of Grace, promised the plaintiff $IOOO if he
would drive Grace and win the Futurity. The plaintiff, with intent to accept,
drove and won the race. Held, that such performance as required by his pre-
vious contract was not a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise.
McDevitt v. Stokes (1917, Ky.) 192 S. W. 681.
For a discussion of these cases see ARTICLE, Does a Pre-existing Duty Defeat
Consideration. p. 362.
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CONTRACTs-CONSTRUCTION-CAusEs BEYOND SFLLER's CONTROL-The defend-
ants contracted in January, i915, to sell to the plaintiff prussiate of soda, a
German product, to be imported by the defendants from Germany. They
stipulated that they should not be liable for losses or damages due to "causes
beyond their control," expressly including war, and also that, if cut off in
whole or in part from their supply "by any other cause or reason," they should
not be liable for non-delivery. Thereafter British Orders in Council, by pre-
venting the exportation of the product from Germany, cut off the supply. The
defendants had on hand when the contract was made a quantity sufficient to fill
the plaintiff's contract, if applied to that alone. When the supply was cut off
they made a ratable distribution of their stock on hand among all the customers
with whom they then had contracts. The plaintiff sought damages for the
failure to deliver the entire quantity. Held, that the defendants were liable,
both because the stipulation in regard to "war" must have referred to the
possibility of participation by the United States in the war, and could not be
construed as referring to the war between England and Germany, as that war
was an existing fact when the contract was made; and because the defendants,
having a sufficient supply to perform their contract with the plaintiff, could
not diminish their obligation under that contract by contracting with others.
Standard Silk Dyeing Co. v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. (1917,
S. D. N. Y.) 244 Fed. 250.
As to the war meant by the parties, the court's interpretation of the contract
is hard to follow. A more natural explanation would seem to be that the then
existing war was directly contemplated, and that the seller put the exception
into his contract for the very purpose of being protected against difficulties
which were feared as a result of that war. Moreover, this part of the opinion
entirely ignores the other very explicit provisions for relief from liability,
which could hardly have been worded more broadly to cover all possible con-
tingencies which might result, without fault on the part of the defendants, in
a diminution of the supply. The court seems to have been hopelessly confused
between the rules applicable to an unqualified agreement and those governing
the construction of one in which the promisor's obligation is expressly qualified.
The court's conclusion on the other point seems hardly more satisfactory.
Though the parties to contracts would do well to express such clauses more
specifically, a clause in the usual general terms must be construed so as to give
effect to the obvious purpose for which it was inserted. When the contract is
made by a manufacturer or jobber in the ordinary course of business, the
purpose of such a clause is clearly to enable the seller to continue business in
the normal and usual way until the shortage occurs or the contingency develops.
To construe the provision in each contract as if the seller were expected to
have no other contracts, is to defeat its purpose altogether. See B. P. Ducas Co.
v. Bayer Co. (1916, Trial T.) 163 N. Y. Supp. 32, 37; and cf. McKeefrey v.
Connellsville Coke & Iron Co. (1893, C. C. A. 3d) 56 Fed. 212, 217. When
the shortage arises, two views are theoretically possible: first, that the contracts
should be filled in the order of their priority in time,-a view which would find
some analogies in equity, but little support in common law doctrines,--or second,
that the available supply should be prorated among customers then holding
contracts. The latter view is more in accordance with the usual business
understanding and practice, and is generally supported by the authorities.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Piper (I9o2, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 133 Fed. io8;
Garfield, etc., Coal Co. V. Pennsylvania C. & C. Co. (i9o8) i99 Mass. 22, 41;
and cases above cited. This rule assumes, of course, that the seller has not
over-contracted his normal capacity. Luhrig Coal Co. v. Jones & Adams Co.
(195o, C. C. A. 6th) 141 Fed. 617, 623. And unless justified by usage or special
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circumstances, the seller must not include in the distribution non-contract
customers, or new contracts taken after the contingency occurred. See cases
above cited. For an apparent exception in favor of regular customers, which
on principle seems open to doubt, cf. Oakman v. Boyce (1868) ioo Mass. 477;
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Billings (19o9) 202 Mass. 457. The principal case
seems an unfortunate departure from a just and reasonable rule.
CONTRACTS-REsTRAINT OF TRADE--VALLDiTY OF RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE
PaicE.-The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from selling
Ingersoll watches at prices below those specified in a notice attached to each
watch., The plaintiff manufactured the watches in New York and sold them,
subject to the price restrictions, to jobbers in New Jersey, from whom the
defendant acquired them. The defendant moved to dismiss the bill. Held, that
the bill was sufficient. Robt. H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co. (1917, N. J.
Ch.) ioi Atl. 1O3O.
See COMMENTS, p. 397.
CRIMINAL LAw-AssAuIT-DSEASE COMMUNICATED BY HUSBAND TO WIFE.-
The defendant, knowing himself to be afflicted with a venereal disease, had
sexual relations with his wife without informing her of his condition. She
contracted the disease. Held, that the defendant was guilty of an assault State
v. Lankford (I917, Del. Gen. Sess.) io2 At. 63.
The marital relation confers upon the husband a privilege of intercourse, but
whether this privilege permits a husband knowingly to infect his wife without
incurring criminal liability is in dispute. The leading English case holds that
it does. Regina v. Clarence (1888) I6 Cox C. C. 511. But Hawkins, J., dissent-
ing, said that though a simple act of communion is lawful, one combined with
contagion is not, there being no consent to the injection of poison. This raises
the much disputed question of what is meant by consent American courts have
held that the administering of poison in food constitutes an assault, on the
ground that there is no consent to the taking of poison. Commonwealth v.
Stratton (1873) 114 Mass. 303 (Spanish fly in figs); Johnson v. State (1893)
92 Ga. 37, 17 S. E. 974 (arsenic solution in coffee). The English cases are
contra. Regina v. Walkden (1845) I Cox C. C. 282 (Spanish fly in ale); Regina
v. Hanson (1849) 2 C. & K. 912 (Spanish fly in liquor). Intercourse secured by
impersonation is, because of the consent, at most an assault and not rape.
Regina v. Saunders (1838) 8 C. & P. 265; Regina v. Williams (1838) 8 C. & P.
286; but see Regina v. Dee (1884) 15 Cox C. C. 579, and section 4 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict, C. 69). "Consent" to sexual
intercourse induced by advice that it is a surgical operation is no consent Regina
v. Flattery (1877) L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 410. Consent is a form of intent, the con-
senting party intending to undergo certain consequences. See Prof. Walter W.
Cook, Act, Intention and Motive (1917) 26 YArn LAW JOURNAL 645. If the hus-
band's marital privilege cannot be exercised without producing other conse-
quences not intended by the wife, i. e., not consented to, the exercise of the
privilege must be foregone or a criminal liability will be incurred. No other
American authority on the precise point has been found.
CRIMINAL LAw-LARcENY-DIvERSION OF WATER FROM CITY MAINS.-The
defendant had surreptitiously diverted water around a meter located on his
land so as to prevent registration of the total amount used. In a prosecution
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for larceny the defendant contended that the city which supplied the water had
merely the privilege of taking the water from its natural courses and charging
for its distribution and that the water had not assumed such character as
personal property as to become the subject of larceny; and also that possession
and ownership of the water had been surrendered to the defendant when the
water came on his land and before it reached the point of diversion. Held, that
the defendant was guilty of larceny of the property of the city. Clark v. State
(1917, Okla.) 167 Pac. 1156.
On the question when possession passes to a customer supplied with an
article by means of pipes the decision is supported by cases involving larceny
of gas. See Woods v. People (i9o6) 222 Ill. 293, 78 N. E. 607, 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 56o, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 736, and cases there collected. But with respect
to ownership by the company or municipality furnishing the supply, the case
of water presents theoretical questions which do not arise in the case of a
manufactured or mineral product like gas. Water flowing in its natural course
is not itself the subject of property, either as realty or as personalty, the rights
and privileges of the public or of the owner of the soil underneath or of
riparian owners being merely rights and privileges of appropriation and user.
Race v. Ward (1855, Q. B.) 4 E. & B. 702; Brown v. Cunningham (i8gi) 82
Ia. 512, 48 N. W. io42. But when lawfully appropriated and reduced to pos-
session in a cistern or other artificial container by any person for his own
private use there seems no doubt that it becomes personal property. See Race
v. Ward, supra. Just what constitutes sufficient appropriation and possession
is a question not fully answered by the few authorities found. It is clear
that ice cut and stored is properly held a subject of larceny. Ward v. People
(1843, N. Y. Ct Err.) 6 Hill 144. And it has been held that one who lawfully
enters on the surface of the ice in a public river, stakes off a portion, prepares
it for cutting, and continually guards and protects it, has sufficient possession
to maintain an action for conversion. Hickey v. Hazard (1877) 3 Mo. App.
480; see also Brown v. Cunningham, supra. In an English case, which seers
to be the decision nearest to the principal case, one drawing water without
right from a pipe was held guilty of larceny, but the case is distinguishable in
that there the water was, when stolen, in the pipes of and under the control
of a purchaser from the water company. Ferens v. O'Brien (1883) I Q. B. D.
21. Purely as a matter of legal theory it would seem that the question whether
a municipality, in a case like the principal case, acquires a property right in
the water in its distribution system, or merely the right to divert and conduct
the water to the consumer, might be answered either way. The actual decision
was no doubt influenced by the court's lack of sympathy with what seemed a
highly technical defense, and the absence of any criminal statute to reach the
case, if the elements of larceny were found wanting. The result will com-
mend itself to the practical man and it avoids the necessity of special legislation
such as has been found necessary in some states to reach the case of "stealing"
electricity. See 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 739, note.
CRIMINAL LAw-SPECrFIC INTENT-AssAuLT UPON MISTAKEN PnsoN.-A
statute declared it an offense to make "an assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily injury," without provocation
or "where the circumstances of the assault show an abandoned or malignant
heart." The information charged the defendant with an assault with a revolver
upon S with intent to injure K. Held, that the indictment was insufficient since
it failed to allege that there was intent to injure the person assaulted. People
v. Stoyan (1917) 280 Ill. 330, 117 N. E. 464.
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In homicide, under the doctrine of "implied" or "constructive" malice,
so-called, "constructive intent" or "transposed intent" is held to be sufficient
State v. Smith (1847, S. C.) 2 Strob. 77; see Clark, Crim. Law 53. Thus if A
intends to kill X but the bullet strikes and kills Y, it is said that there is
"constructive intent" to kill Y. State v. Pollard (i897) 139 Mo. 220, 40 S. W.
949; see 63 L. R. A. 66o. This is but a fictitious way of stating the rule that A
may be guilty of the murder of Y, although he have no intent to kill or even
to injure Y. See 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) io7o. But when a statutory or a common
law crime has as one of its essential elements an actual or specific intent to
injure the person attacked, it is obvious that the doctrine of "constructive" or
"transposed" intent is not applicable. See Carter v. State (i8go) 28 Tex. App.
355, 13 S. W. 147. If A assaults B in the belief that lie is C, it may well be
questioned whether it is strictly true that A "intended" to attack B. He
certainly intended to attack C. Has he, then, more than one intent? See the
discussion in Professor Cook's article, Act, Intention and Motive (1917) 26 YALE
LAw JOuRNAL 645. In the principal case the court construes the Illinois statute
as requiring a specific intent to injure the person assaulted. If this is the true
construction, the conclusion of the court necessarily follows. But it may well
be doubted whether if the indictment had alleged an "intent" to injure the
person assaulted, the court would not have held the charge proved by evidence
that the attack had been made under a misapprehension as to the identity of
the person assaulted. See McGeehee v. State (i885) 62. Miss. 772; Walker v.
State (i856) 8 Ind. 290. See also 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 63o and 37 ibid. 172.
EvmnNCE-INTERPRETATIoN-DmsE BY MISTAKEN Dssc~nrioN.-The testa-
tor's will contained a provision devising to his daughter M "the north 25 acres
of the northeast quarter of section 17." He did not own any part of the north-
east quarter but he did own the northwest quarter of the section. The devise in
question followed a clause giving another daughter the south 15 acres of the
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 17. There was no resid-
uary clause. Held, that the will was correctly interpreted to vest in M the north
25 acres of the northwest quarter. Alford v. Bennett (1917, InI.) 117 N. E. 89.
The operative or "ultimate," facts which, as a matter of substantive law,
determine the legal effect of a devise fall into two groups, namely, (i) the testa-
tor's intentions; and (2) an approximate, though not necessarily a perfect,
expression thereof in a properly attested writing. Hence the process of inter-
pretation has two objects of inquiry: (i) What were the testator's actual
intentions as shown by such evidence, intrinsic and extrinsic, as may be admis-
sible; and (2) have those intentions been sufficiently expressed in the will? Cf.
Hawkins, 2 Jurid. Soc. Papers 298. No cases involving interpretation have
caused the courts more difficulty than those in which the devise has accurately
described land that the testator does not own, but would describe, with the change
of a word or figure, land that" he does own. In such cases the difficulty is not
to ascertain the testator's actual intentions-he clearly int~nds to devise his own
property-but to determine whether the expression of those intentions is a close
enough approximation to be given legal effect. If, disregarding the erroneous
words or figures, the remaining words of the will approximately, although not
perfectly, express the intention to convey the property he owned, the devise
should be given effect. Patch v. White (1886) 117 U. S. 21o, 6 Sup. Ct 617;
Govin v. Metz (1894, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 79 Hun. 461, 29 N. Y. Supp. 988. Illinois,
however, adopted the contrary view in Kurtz v. Hibner (1870) 55 Ill. 514. This
case has been severely criticised [e. g., see Judge Redfield's note in (1871) io Am.
L. REG. (N. S.) 97 and Judge Caton's reply, ibid. 353] ; but it has continued to
be followed in numerous decisions. See Lonax v. Lomax (1905) 218 Ill. 629,
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75 N. E. iO76; Graves v. Rose (igio) 246 Ill. 76, 92 N. E. 6oi. Side by side,
however, with this line of decisions has been another which, without repudiating
the former, recognizes and applies the more liberal doctrine of Patch v. White.
See Decker v. Decker (1887) 121 Ill. 341, 12 N. E. 75o; Gano v. Gano (19o9)
239 Ill. 539, 88 N. E. 146. When the will contains descriptive words indicating
possession or ownership, the decisions holding that the intentions are sufficiently
expressed are not necessarily in conflict with the Kurtz dase. Bowen v. Allen
(885) 113 Ill. 53; Lawrence v. Lawrence (1912) 255 Ill. 365, 99 N. E.. 675. But
since the lack of such descriptive words may, according to other cases, be sup-
plied by the "presumption" that the testator intended to dispose of property
which he owned [as declared in Collins v. Capps (I9O8) 235 Ill. 56o, 85 N. E. 934,
and the principal case], it would seem that the Kurtz case might well be recog-
nized as no longer law. For a collection of authorities outside of Illinois, see
6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 942. It is believed that much of the difficulty and confusion
would be avoided if the courts were to recognize that, as indicated at the outset,
the primary problems involved in the so-called process of interpretation, or con-
struction, are those of substantive law, not those of the law of evidence.
EviDENcE-SELF-INRmINATIo-CmpuLsoRy TAXING OF FINGER PRINTS.-
Under a statute providing "that no person convicted of . . . disorderly conduct
• . . shall be sentenced . . . until the finger print records are officially searched,"
the court ordered that finger prints be taken of the defendant The defendant
objected to the order as a violation of his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. Held, that the taking of finger prints is not a violation of the
constitutional privilege. People v. Sallow (i917, Gen. Sess.) 165 N. Y. Supp. 915.
There is some doubt as to the origin and original policy of the self-incrimina-
tion rule. Professor Wigmore contends that it is not a common law rule at all,
but a gradual perversion of a statutory rule, intended to prevent a usurpation
of jurisdiction on the part of the Ecclesiastical Courts. See his articles in
5 H.av. L. REv. 7I and I5 ibid. 6Io. With reference to the forcible exhibition
of the person, there is a line of cases which have followed the rule blindly.
State v. Height (19o2) 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W. 935. Carried to its logical con-
clusion, the rule would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner, against his will, for
the purpose of drawing deductions from his appearance, and it has even been
so held. State v. Jacobs (1858) 50 N. C. 259. The rule has been severely criti-
cized, the modern tendency limiting its application to testimonial utterances, and,
by analogy, to documents taken from the defendant, though even here a dis-
tinction has been drawn between documents which are the basis of the charge,
and those which are merely of an evidentiary character. State v. Krisinski
(I9o5) 78 Vt 162, 62 At. 37. Holt v. United States (igio) 218 U. S. 245, 252,
31 Sup. Ct. 2, 6. The instant case presents a novel application of the objection
against self-incrimination. Similar rulings have been made in somewhat analo-
gous cases. State v. Ah Chuey (1879) 14 Nev. 79 (exhibition of defendant's
arm) ; Garvin v. State (1876) 52 Miss. 207 (profert of his person); State v.
Graham (1876) 74 N. C. 646 (comparison of boots with boot-prints). The
instant case suggests a distinction between cases in which the defendant was
required merely to remain passive and those in which he was required to
exercise volition, the latter being regarded as a violation of the constitutional
privilege. It is submitted, however, that the distinction is of doubtful validity..
Strictly speaking, even so-called passivity involves an exercise of volition.
Moreover the application -of the court's test would lead to practically the same
results as would blind adherence to the original rule. It is believed that the
constitutional privilege should be deemed to prohibit compulsory exhibition by
the defendant only in cases where such exhibition might tend to create undue
prejudice in the jury.
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FEDERAL EMPLOYvEs' LIABLITY Acr-SvImv OF AcTION FOR INJURIES-CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF BENEFICIARY AS DEFExNs-The plaintiff's 
sixteen year
old son was injured while in the defendant's employ and died as a result of such
injuries. The plaintiff had obtained this employment for his son by fraudulently
risrepresenting his age as seventeen. This conduct by the father had 
been
adjudged by the trial court as contributory negligence. Held, that the contribu-
tory negligence of the father was a defense to the action. Crevelli v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (i917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 66.
The federal Employers' Liability Act of i9o8 provided two distinct rights of
action: one in the injured employee for his personal loss and suffering when his
injuries were not immediately fatal, the other in his personal representative for
the pecuniary loss sustained by certain designated relatives from his death,
whether the death was instantaneous or resulted later. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co.
v. Vreeland (913) 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct 192. Prior to the Amendment of
igio the first named right of action did not survive the employee's death.
American R. R. Co. v. Didricksen (1912) 227 U. S. 145, 33 Sup. Ct 224. But
that Amendment provided for its survival for the benefit of the same relatives
as were beneficiaries of the second cause of action above mentioned. St. Louis
Iron Mt. Ry. Co. v. Craft (1915) 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct 704. In the principal
case it was admitted that the father's contributory negligence was a defense to
the second cause of action, i. e., his right to recover for his own pecuniary loss
due to his son's death; but the plaintiff contended that such negligence did not
defeat recovery on the first cause of action, i. e., the son's right to recover for
his pain and suffering. Under state statutes where survival is for the benefit of
the estate, it is generally held that the negligence of one who will ultimately be
benefited is no bar to recovery. Love v. Detroit etc. R. R. Co. (1912) 170 Mich.
i; 135 N. W. 963; Nashville Lumber Co. v. Busbee (1911) ioo Ark. 76; 139
S. W. 3O1. The court attempts to distinguish such cases on the ground that
recovery under the federal Act is for the benefit of named beneficiaries, and from
this the court argues that the right of action which the Amendment causes to
survive, is really a new right of action and that the beneficiary is therefore
barred by his negligence. This construction of the Act seems opposed to the
express terms of the Amendment and also to the language of the Supreme Court
in St. Louis & Iron Mt. Ry. v. Craft, supra. Under a similar state statute, the
Connecticut court has declared that negligence of the statutory distributee would
not bar recovery by the administrator. Wilmot v. McPadden (9o5) 78 Conn.
276, 284, 61 Atl. lo6g, io72; see also Warren v. Manchester etc. Ry. (igoo) 70
N. H. 352, 47 AtI. 735. No precise authority construing the federal Act was cited
by the court, and none has been found.
FOREIGN CRPORATIONS-SERVICE ON SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER'STATUTE NOT
REQUIRING- NOTICE TO CORPoRATioN.-Section 405 of the California Civil'Code
provided for service of summons upon the Secretary of State in case a foreign
corporation doing business in the state should fail to designate an agent for
service. The Code did not provide for notification by the Secretary of State to
the foreign corporation. Held, that the provision for such service was uncon-
stitutional as not amounting to due process of law. Knapp v. Bullock Tractor
Co. (igi7, S. D. Cal.) 242 Fed. 543.
Authority on this subject is divided. See in support of the principal case, King
Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch (igi6, Nev.) 232 Fed. 485. The decision is
opposed to that of the California Supreme Court on the same statute. Olender
v. Crystalline Mining Co. (19o6) 149 Cal. 482, 86 Pac. io82. An apparently
similar statute was upheld in North Carolina on the theory that a state, having
the privilege of excluding foreign corporations altogether, may impose any con-
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dition upon their admission, which does not conflict with federal policy. Fisher
v. Traders' etc. Ins. Co. (19o4) 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667. To this the California
court added that consent to service on the Secretary of the State might be
inferred from the failure to designate any other agent On the other hand
statutes which require foreign corporations to waive the privilege of removing
cases to the federal courts have been held invalid by the United States Supreme
Court on the greund that the state could not enforce an agreement attempting
to deprive the corporation of rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Home Insurance Co. v. Morse (1874 U. S.) 2o Wall. 445; Southern Pacific-
Co. v. Denton (1892) 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct 44. In answer to this reasoning
it may be pointed out that many constitutional privileges may be waived by the
voluntary consent of the person intended to be benefited, and that the admitted
power of excluding foreign corporations altogether would seem to include the
power of requiring such waiver as a condition of admission. Cf. Horn Silver
Mining Co. v. New York (I89g2) 143 U. S. 305, 315, 12 Sup. Ct 403, 405. The
true explanation of the decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton would seem
to be that suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes, that the agreement required in that
case was contrary to the policy of the federal constitution as embodied in the
provisions for the establishment of federal courts. See Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Kansas (1gio) 216 U. S. i, 54, 30 Sup. Ct 19o, 208, per Holmes, J., dissenting.
The real question in the principal case would be, then, whether there is a similar
policy preventing a valid agreement to be bound by a personal judgment without
notice. The difficulty seems less serious when it is pointed out that the corpora-
tion had only to designate an agent as the statute provided, to avoid the risk of
which it complained. But the whole subject of what Mr. Justice Holmes called
"unconstitutional conditions" will remain in some doubt until the Supreme Court
clears it up. In the principal case any inference that the corporation consented
to the statutory condition that service might be made upon the Secretary of
State would have been purely fictitious, as there was no attempt whatever to
comply with the statute regulating the admission of foreign corporations.
FRAruuL~xT CONvEYANcEs-CoNsWERATIoN-AGREEMENT TO SUroRT GRANTOR.-
A grantor conveyed property to the defendant in consideration of the latter's
promise to support the grantor for life. The property retained by the grantor
was of little value and less than the existing claim of the plaintiff but there was.
no evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors. Held, that the conveyance was
fraudulent and void. Ludlow Savings Bank v. Knight (1917, Vt) I02 At. 51.
The law of fraudulent. conveyances does not avoid transfers made on good
consideration and bona fide. But "good consideration" is construed to mean,
as between the grantor's creditors and those claiming under the transfer, a
valuable consideration. Bump, Fraud. Cony. (3d ed.) 221; Seymour v. Wilson
(1859) 19 N. Y. 417. In -the principal case the transaction was valid inter partes
and, since they were innocent of actual fraud, courts of equity would have given
the grantor a remedy had the grantee failed to provide the promised support
Payette v. Ferrier (1899) 20 Wash. 479, 55 Pac. 629. As to existing creditors,
however, the weight of authority holds such a transfer fraudulent and void
'irrespective of the intent of the parties. Egery v. Johnson (I879) 7o Me. 258;
Rolfe v. Clarke (1916) 224 Mass. 407, 113 N. E. 182; see Bigelow, Fraud. Cony.
(Knowlton's ed.) 545. The opinion in the instant case states that "though
the consideration is valuable, it is wanting in good faith as to creditors and the
character of the transaction is such as to put the grantee upon inquiry." It is
submitted, however, that a sounder explanation is to say that though the grantee
is a purchaser in good faith, the consideration is not valuable as to existing
creditors. As to them, the conveyance is considered gratuitous, because the
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consideration is an unperformed executory promise for 
something of no value
to the grantor's creditors. This view is consistent with the generally 
recognized
rule that the grantee will be protected to the extent that he has 
actually provided
support Kelsey v. Kelley (18go) 63 Vt 41, 22 Atl. 597; Harris 
v. Brink (1896)
oo Iowa, 366, 69 N. W. 684. While the view that the original transaction 
was
lacking in good faith would prevent the grantee claiming reimbursement 
for such
support See Finnell v. Million (19o3) 99 Mo. App. 552, 74 S. W. 419; also
Bigelow, Fraud. Con'. (Knowlton's ed.) 466 et seq. It is true that an 
unper-
formed executory promise to pay money may, under certain 
circumstances, be
deemed a valuable consideration as against creditors. See Bump, Fraud. 
Cony.
( 3d ed.) 225. But it is believed the cases support 
the contention that an unper-
formed executory promise is not valuable consideration when 
the promise relates
to something valueless to creditors. Cf. Swift v. Hart (1885, N. Y. Sup. 
Ct)
35 Hun 128 (executory contract for legal services). 
An exception, perhaps
illogical, exists in the case of an executory promise to marry in consideration 
of
the conveyance. See De Hierapolis v. Reilly (igoi) I68 N. Y. 585, 6o 
N. E.
1n1o. Somewhat analogous to the support cases are those which declare that 
a
person cannot create a spendthrift trust in his own favor. Ghormley 
v. Smith
(i8gi) i39 Pa. 584, 21 AtI. 135. The principal case undoubtedly reaches a sound
conclusion, though its reasoning may perhaps be subject to the criticism 
above
suggested. Cf. Merithew v. Ellis (1917, Me.) =O2 Atl. 3oi.
INTERNATIONAL LAwv-DIPLoMATIC OFFICERS-IMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
FROM
ExEcu=nON.The defendant, the accredited Minister of Bolivia, had 
waived his
diplomatic privileges in proceedings involving the settlement of 
an estate of
which he had acted as attorney and administrator. The plaintiff, as 
beneficiary
of the estate, sought to have a writ of sequestration issued against 
the property
of the defendant for a balance, surcharged upon his accounts as administrator,
which he had failed to pay into court The plaintiff agreed not 
to enter the
Bolivian Legation or to seize anything necessary to maintain the personal 
com-
fort or dignity of the defendant as Minister. The Diplomatic Privileges 
Act
(1708, 7 Anne c. 12) declared null and void all writs and 
processes sued out
against the person or property of public Ministers. Held, that a writ of execu-
tion directed against personal property of the defendant was void. Re Suarez
(1917, Ch. D.) 117 L. T. 239.
See COMMENTS, p. 392.
NEGLIGENCE-LABILITY TO VOLUNTEERS-INJURY To FImEMA.-The plaintiff,
a city fireman, sued in case for injuries received while attempting to extinguish
a fire, alleged to have been caused by sparks negligently thrown from the defend-
ant's locomotive. Held, that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty and was,
therefore, not liable. Clark v. B. & M. R. R. (1917, N. H.) ioi Atl. 795.
It is well settled that firemen or policemen who are injured through the negli-
gence of the owner with respect to the condition of premises on which they
have come in the course of their duty, cannot recover, since they were mere
licensees to whom the property owner owed no duty of care. Lunt v. Post (o.
(91o) 48 Colo. 316, 11o Pac. 2o3. But see Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell 
Con-
inercial Co. (1899) 22 Mont 312, 56 Pac. 358. The instant case is distinguishable,
however, in that it is an action against the negligent third party who caused the
fire. The cases are uniform in permitting recovery by a volunteer injured in
attempting, reasonably and with due care, to save human life endangered by
the negligence of the defendants. Eckert v. Long Island R. Co. (1871) 43 N. Y.
502. Where the risk is incurred to save property, the courts are not agreed,
although the weight of authority seems to favour a recovery. Pegrant v. Sea-
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board (1905) 139 N. C. 303, 51 S. E. 975. Contra, Cook v. Johston (1885) 58
Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 388. And this is thought to be true whether or not the
volunteer has an interest in the property which he seeks to save. Cf. Kambour
v. B. & M. R. R. Co. (1913) 77 N. H. 33, 5o, 86 Atl. 624, 633. The objection
raised to the volunteer theory is that the defendant ought not t6 be held because
injuries to a volunteer are not consequences which could be foreseen as likely to
occur. See Pike v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1889 C. C. N. H.) 39 Fed. 255. But this
objection is met in the instant case by the fact that a defendant who negligently
starts a fire might well foresee that firemen would attempt to extinguish it and
thereby incur risk of injury. It is submitted, therefore, that even courts which
refuse to permit recovery to an ordinary volunteer attempting to save property
might well regard a plaintiff fireman more favorably.
PuBLic UTILITIEs-RATE REGuLAT ro-ExcLuDING "GOING VALUE" IN VALUA-
Tiox OF PRoPERTY.-In valuing the property of the petitioner for purposes of
fixing rates, the California Railroad Commission excluded the item of develop-
ment cost as an element of "going value" because excessive earnings since the
development period had been sufficient to offset all deficits of that period. Held,
that such exclusion by the Commission was correct San Joaquin Light & Power
Corp. v. Railroad Commission (1917, Cal.) 165 Pac. 16.
See CoMMENTs, p. 386.
ToRrs-RIGHT OF BuRIA--FAILRua TO NOTIFY PAPENT OF CHILD's DATH.-
The mutilated body of the plaintiff's son was found by the defendant's employes
upon its railroad track. Letters upon the body disclosed the plaintiff's name and
address. The defendant notified only the coroner, who buried the body without
notifying the plaintiff. Suit was brought for mental anguish alleged to have
been caused by the defendant in depriving the plaintiff of the solace of burying
her son. Held, that the railroad company was not liable. Awtrey v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co. (1917, Va.) 93 S. E. 570.
It is frequently said that "there can be no property in a dead body." See
13 Cyc. 267 and cases there cited. While it is true that neither the executor nor
the relatives of a decedent have, with respect to the corpse, all the rights, privi-
leges, powers and immunities which make up the complex aggregate of jural
relations usually counoted by the term "property," nevertheless the courts do
recognize and enforce certain rights, privileges, etc., with respect to dead bodies,
similar to those of an owner in ordinary property. The near relatives may
enjoin interference with the corpse after interment Pierce v. Proprietors of
Swan Point Cem. (1872) io R. I. 227; cf. Pulsifer v. Douglass (igoi) 94 Me.
556, 48 Atl. i18. And before interment, in the absence of testamentary dis-
position of the body, the surviving spouse or next of kin is entitled, for the
purpose of burial, to have possession of it turned over in the same condition in
which it .was at death. Foley v. Phelps (1896) 1 N. Y. App. Div. 551, 37 N. Y.
Supp. 471; Larson. v. Chase (1891) 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238; cf. Reg. v. Fox
(1841, Eng. Q. B.) 2 Ad. & El. N. S. 246. In the case of a deceased child this
right belongs to the surviving father or mother. Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry. Co. (1914) 167 N. C. 55, 83 S. E. 12; Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital (1911)
202 N. Y. 259, 59 N. E. 695. A wilful or negligent mutilation or withholding of
the corpse is a violation of this right, for which the surviving spouse or next of
kin may, by the weight of authority, recover not only actual damages, such as
increased burial expenses, but also damages for outraged feelings and distress
of mind. Kyles v. Southern Ry Co. (19o8) 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 307; Larson
vz. Chase, supra; contra, Long v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co: (195o) I5 Okla.
512, 86 Pac. 289; cf. Deavors v. Southern Express Co. (1917, Ala.) 76 So. 288.
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In the principal case, the plaintiff attempted to establish a violation of her right
to receive her son's body for burial by showing a failure by the defendant to
notify her of his death. As the court points out, a failure to notify-a mere
omission-is a very different act on the part of the defendant from an affirmative
mutilation or withholding of the body. Cf. Doxtator v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co.
(x899) i2o Mich. 596, 79 N. W. 922. Only rarely does the law of torts hold a
person liable for mere nonfeasance. See Bigelow, Torts (8th ed.) iii. For an
interesting case holding a carrier liable for. the affirmative act of burying a
deceased passenger at sea, see Finley v. Atlantic Trans. Co. (1917, N. Y.) 115
N. E. 715, commented upon in 26 Y.A.E LAw JoLURAL 790.
T.ILs-MiscomDucr OF JURY-STATEMENT BY JUROR OF FACTS NOT IN Evi-
DENce-The defendant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of a child
run over by his automobile. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the
defendant was intoxicated at the time. During the jury's deliberations two of
the jurors made statements to the others in regard to their own knowledge of
the defendant's habits of intoxication. After a verdict of guilty the defendant
moved for a new trial and presented a juror's affidavit that these statements had
induced him to change his vote. Held, that the defendant was entitled to a new
irial. State v. Salmer (1917, Ia.) 164 N. W. 62o.
The majority of the states have followed the doctrine laid down by Lord
Mansfield, that the affidavit of a juror in regard to the jury's misconduct will
not be received. See Vaise v. Delaval (785, K. B.) i T. R ix. For recent cases
on both sides, see State v. Ausplund (1917, Oreg.) 167 Pac. iog, and Barber v.
Emery (I917, Kan.) 167 Pac. io44. The cases considering what misconduct, so
proved, will be ground for new trial are therefore limited to a few jurisdictions,
including Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, and the federal courts. A
statement of facts not offered in evidence, when made by a juror during the
deliberations of the jury, is a plain violation of the theory of the "hearsay" rule.
See 2 Wigmore, Evid. sec. 1362. Moreover, the accused has a right of cross-
examination and quite generally by constitutional guaranty the right of con-
frontation. See People v. Schallman (1916) 273 Ill. 564, 113 N. E. i3; Morris
v. United States (i9o7, C. C. A. 5th) 149 Fed. 123. There has been some dif-
ference of opinion whether the law will presume that the verdict was influenced
by statements by a juror of facts not in evidence; but the bulk of authority is
that the statement must be of such weight that it might reasonably be calculated
to influence the verdict. Douglas v. Agne (i9o4) 125 Ia. 67, 99 N. W. 550. In
the majority of the cases in which a new trial was ordered there was a conflict
of evidence and it appeared affirmatively that the juror's improper statement
influenced the verdict. State v. Wegener (1917, Ia.) 162 N. W. IO4O, io42; Ham-
bright v. State (i9o5) 47 Tex. Cr. 518, 84 S. W. 597. There is found in a number
of cases, a strong suggestion that a different rule might be applied in civil cases.
See State v. Wegener (supra). It is true that criminal cases present a stronger
case, since confrontation is then quite generally a matter of constitutional guar-
anty; but though in civil cases confrontation of witnesses by the party may be
dispensed with, the right to cross-examination has been universally recognized
as a basis for many of the rules of evidence. On principle, therefore, it would
seem that no distinction should be made between civil and criminal cases in
respect to misconduct which should be the ground for a new trial.
TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUsTs-ABOLUTE DEVISE ON ORAL TRusT.-A hus-
band by will left real estate to his wife. On the face of the will the devise
was absolute, but at the time of the execution of the will the wife orally
promised the husband that the property would be kept intact and on her death
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divided equally between their two children. After the husband's death the
wife conveyed all the property to one of the children. The other child brought
an action in equity to establish a trust in her favor. Held, that she had no
enforceable interest. Brown v. Kausche (I917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 1O75.
See COMMENTS, p. 389.
TRUSTS-UNINCORPORATED ASSocrATIoNS-DIsPoSIIoN OF PROPERY ON Dis-
SOLUTION.-Funds were held in trust for a constantly changing group of bene-
ficiaries. These funds were contributed by the beneficiaries in accordance with
certain rules, and were to be used to perform certain services for the contributors
for the time being. The need for the service came to an end. Held, that the
funds remaining should be divided among the contributors "ascertained at the
date when the purpose of the fund came to an end, in proportion to their con-
tributions." In re Customs & Excise Officers' und [1917] 2 Ch. 18.
The English law of trusts provides a flexible scheme by means of which volun-
tary unincorporated associations may obtain many of the advantages which
incorporation would confer. See 3 Maitland, Collected Papers, 321. Trusts of
this kind usually have a changing group of beneficiaries and are thus frequently
confused with charitable trusts, from which they differ in the fact that there is
always at any moment a group of definite beneficiaries. See Old South Society
v. Crocker (1875) irg Mass. i, 23. When the affairs of an unincorporated
association whose property is held in trust are to be wound up, it is not always
clear just who is entitled to the property. The guiding principle is undoubted,
and is well stated in the principal case: "the right . . . in these cases is fojunded
on contract," i. e., upon the agreement of the parties. The chief difficulty is to
ascertain the fair meaning of that agreement. When that is done, apparently
inconsistent decisions prove not to be so in fact. For example, in Braithwaite v.
Attorney-General [1gog] I Ch. 51o-a decision which at first may be thought to
be inconsistent with the principal case-the court found that, upon the true con-
struction of the agreements involved, all the contributors to the fund had received
all they had bargained for. That being so, the surplus remaining went to the
Crown as bona vacantia. A similar result was reached on the same reasoning in
Cunnack v. Edwards [1896] 2 Ch. 679. On the other hand, the court in another
case held that on the true construction of the agreement the fund remaining
on dissolution should be divided among those who were members of the associa-
tion at the time of the passing of the resolution for dissolution. In re Printers'
etc. Society [1899] 2 Ch. 184. Cf. Coe v. Washington Mills (1889) 149 Mass. 543,
21 N. E. 966. The decision in the principal case is reached by following the same
guiding principle, ascertaining the fair meaning of the agreements of the various
parties as found in the rules of the association.
VILLS-MISTAKE-EFFECT OF TESTATOR'S ERaoN ous BELIEF OF SON'S DEATH.-
In a will contest the only son of a testator offered evidence that the will was
made under the mistaken belief that he was dead. Held, that the will was not
open to attack on this ground. Bowerman v. Burris (1917, Tenn.) 197 S. W.
490.
Mistakes of a testator with respect to his will may be classified as intrinsic
or extrinsic. Intrinsic mistakes relate to the nature or contents of the instru-
ment. Extrinsic mistakes relate to collateral facts in consequence of which
the terms of the will may have been drawn differently than they would have
been if the testator had not entertained the mistake. Mistakes of the former
class which concern the nature of the instrument render the whole will void for
lack of animus testandi. Swett v. Boardman (1804) I Mass. 258; In re Meyer's
Estate [19o8] P. 353; Nelson v. McDonald (1891, N. Y.) 61 Hun. 406, 16 N. Y.
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Supp. 273. If the intrinsic mistake consists in the insertion of words without
the -testator's knowledge such words may be stricken out and the rest of 
the
will admitted to probate. Morrell v. Morrell (1882) L. R. 7 P. D. 68. But
words omitted by mistake cannot be added by a court of probate. Goods 
of
Schott [i9oi] P. io. On the other hand, extrinsic mistakes do not affect 
the
validity of the will or any part of it In re Tousey's Will (igo, N. Y. Surr.
Ct) 34 Misc. 363, 69 N. Y. Supp. 846 (mistake as to death of cousin) 
; Howell v.
Troutman (i86o) 53 N. C. 276 (mistake as to testator's fatherhood of bene-
ficiary) ; Kidney's Will (i895) 33 N. B. 9 (mistake as to legitimacy of child
named as legatee). In order to make the fact of extrinsic mistake material, 
not
only the mistake but also the disposition which the testator would have 
made
had he not entertained the mistake must appear from the will. Dicta in Gifford
v. Dyer (1852) 2 R. I. 99, and Dunham v. Averill (1877) 45 Conn. 61. The
correctness on principle of this view is strengthened by analogous cases which
apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation when the mistake appears
on the face of the revoking instrument. Campbell v. French (797) 3 Ves. Jun.
321. In some states by express statute, a child erroneously assumed to be dead
is allowed to share in the estate. See In re Garraud (1868) 35 Cal. 336. More
usually statutes protect pretermitted heirs unless their disinheritance was inten-
tional. Whitby v. Motz (1914) 125 Minn. 40, 145 N. W. 623. The effect of
.showing a mistaken belief as to death in such a case would clearly 
be to allow
the child to share in the estate. The principal case is interesting as an addi-
tional authority upon a point on which the cases are not numerous.
WORKM N's COMPENSATION AcT-BASIS OF COMENsATIN-GRATUI
M ES-
I n
addition to his weekly wage as railway porter, the claimant received "tips"
averaging 12 shillings a week. The custom of "tipping" was sanctioned by the
employer. Held, that such gratuities were part of the "earnings" on which the
amount of compensation should be based. Helps v. Great Western Railway Co.
(1917, C. A.) 117 L. T. 22g.
The compensation to be paid an injured employee under workmen's com-
pensation acts depends, according to the great majority of the statutes, on his
recompense under the contract of hiring. The expression used in the Acts is
either "earnings" or "wages." Usually a legislative definition of the term used
is contained in the Act But, despite such attempt at definition, the solution of
the problem whether gratuities are to be considered requires the interpretation
by the court of the terms used, except in New Jersey -where the Act expressly
excludes gratuities. In England, the phrase "average earnings in the employ-
ment" had previously been held, under certain conditions, to include money
received as "tips" from one other than the employer. Penn. v. Spiers & Pond
Ltd. (C. A.) figo] i K. B. 766, 98 L. T. 541. This holding was reaffirmed in
the principal case. In the only American case found on the point, the term
"wages" was similarly construed to include "tips" of a taxicab driver. Sloat
v. Rochester Taxicab Co. (1917) 177 N. Y. App. Div. 57, 163 N. Y. Supp. 9o4.
The court in that case declared that other provisions of the Act indicated that
the legislature saw no broad distinction between the two phrases. In view of
the economic considerations behind the enactment of the legislation a liberal
interpretation is justifed to effectuate their purpose. See New York C. R. R.
Co. v. White (1916) 243 U. S. i88, 37 Sup. Ct 247; Powers v. Hotel Bond Co.
(915) 89 Conn. 143, 146, 93 Atl. 245, 247. The decisions as to "tips" are
believed sound.
